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Abstract. Recent work has shown that the introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in traffic could
help reduce traffic jams. Deep reinforcement learning methods demonstrate good performance in com-
plex control problems, including autonomous vehicle control, and have been used in state-of-the-art AV
controllers. However, the use of deep neural networks (DNNs) renders automated driving vulnerable
to machine learning-based attacks. In this work, we explore backdooring/trojanning of DRL-based AV
controllers. We develop a trigger design methodology that is based on well-established principles of
traffic physics. The malicious actions include vehicle deceleration and acceleration to cause stop-and-
go traffic waves to emerge (congestion attacks), or AV acceleration resulting in the AV crashing into the
vehicle in front (insurance attack). In the pre-injection stage, we consider the stealth of this backdoor
attack by selecting triggers that are closest to the genuine data. We demonstrate our attack in a baseline
traffic scenario of a single-lane ring, and then we generalize it to more lanes and the introduction of
intersections. Experimental results show that the backdoored model does not compromise the perfor-
mance of normal operation with the maximum decrease in cumulative rewards being 1%, but it can be
maliciously activated to cause a crash or congestion when the corresponding triggers appear. We also
discuss the effectiveness of state-of-the-art defenses towards the presented attacks.
Keywords: Autonomous vehicle controller, deep reinforcement learning, backdoor in neural network.
1 Introduction
There is an interesting phenomenon that arises in real-
world traffic, which is the spontaneous emergence of stop-
and-go traffic waves. Conventional thinking was that
something causes these waves to emerge, e.g., an acci-
dent in the downstream, driver rubber-necking, etc. A
real-world experiment conducted by Sugiyama et al. [37]
demonstrated that stop-and-go waves can emerge spon-
taneously (something that traffic theorists had already
speculated). In their experiment, a group of drivers,
equally spaced at a comfortable distance from one an-
other were instructed to drive at the same constant speed
around a circular track. After a short period of time, small
deviations from this plan grew into aggressive oscilla-
tions and, stop-and go waves eventually emerged.
Stern et al. [36] recently demonstrated (also experimen-
tally) that the stop-and-go waves can be removed by con-
trolling one of the vehicles, an autonomous vehicle (AV),
using simple model-based control techniques. This was
later enhanced by Wu et al. [50], who built a new com-
putational simulation-based framework, named “Flow”
[45]. Flow employs deep reinforcement learning (DRL)
techniques, which allows the AV to learn optimal strate-
gies that aim to alleviate congestion, as opposed to be-
ing biased by a simple control model. DRL also enables
their approach to generalize to more complex traffic net-
work architectures, which the models in [36] do not ap-
ply to. Broadly speaking, advances in the last decade
in vehicle automation and communications technologies
have shifted the focus of traffic managers and researchers
to designing congestion management tools for connected
and automated vehicles (CAVs). These include tools that
use CAVs to better manage traffic lights [12], to save en-
ergy [46], and to ensure traffic stability (e.g., removing
stop-and-go waves) [39, 54]. These studies continue to
systematically overlook the impact that cyber-attacks can
have on these automated systems. There have been some
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studies on the cascading effects that cyber-attacks can
have on traffic lights [41] but attacks on AVs and their
impacts on traffic dynamics have received less attention
in the literature.
With deep neural networks (DNNs), DRL works well
in complicated yet data-rich environments and achieves
good performance in complex and high-dimensional
problems, like Atari games [4], complex robot manipula-
tion, and autonomous vehicle operation [34]. But DNNs
are known to be vulnerable to maliciously crafted inputs
known as adversarial examples [38]. As a result, DRL-
controlled AVs are also vulnerable to these attacks [3, 13].
Backdoored neural networks [11] are a new class of at-
tacks on DNNs that only behave maliciously when trig-
gered by a specific input. The networks have high attack
success rate (ASR) on the triggered samples and high test
accuracy on genuine samples. Unlike adversarial exam-
ples, they are model-based attacks which are triggered
using malicious inputs. Since the triggers can be de-
signed according to the attacker’s motives (like stealth-
iness), they provide immense flexibility in attack vector
design. Such neural trojans have been implemented and
explored extensively in classification problems [7, 11, 26]
but have not been explored for problems like reinforce-
ment learning for vehicular traffic systems using sensor
values as triggers.
In this work, we explore stealthy backdoor attacks on
congestion controllers of AVs. We design the set of pos-
sible triggers in accordance with physical constraints im-
posed by traffic systems and depending on the type of
the attack. We further refine the set of triggers so as to
enhance the stealthiness of the attack, and this is done
before the malicious data are injected into the training
dataset. This is to ensure that trigger tuples cannot be dis-
tinguished from genuine training data, thereby promot-
ing stealthiness. We inject the backdoor into the benign
model by retraining the model with the mixture of gen-
uine and malicious (trigger) data. We test our approach
using various traffic scenarios by extending a state-of-the-
art microscopic traffic simulator named SUMO (Simula-
tion of Urban MObility [19], which is the simulator Flow
uses as well [45]). We first focus on a baseline scenario, as-
suming a single-lane circular track, where traffic conges-
tion occurs if all vehicles are human-driven. But the inclu-
sion of one AV in the system, controlled by a DRL model,
relieves the traffic congestion. We explore the possibility
of injecting a backdoor that can worsen congestion only
when triggered by a very specific set of observations. This
congestion attack is inherently at odds with the control ob-
jective of the system. We also perform an insurance attack,
where a trigger tricks the AV into crashing into the vehi-
cle in front. Our trigger set is a combination of positions
and speeds of vehicles in the system and the malicious
actions are bad instructions to accelerate or decelerate.
The trigger conditions are configurable during training
of the malicious models and, since they are observations
of surrounding human-driven cars, are controllable to an
extent by a maliciously driven car. Following the base-
line scenario and towards understanding how our trig-
ger selection methodology generalizes, we also investi-
gate scenarios with more lanes and intersections. Results
corroborate that the optimization methodology proposed
actually generalizes in more complex traffic scenarios. Fi-
nally, we also implement state-of-the-art defense meth-
ods [6, 42] on our backdoor attacks and the results show
that they cannot distinguish our trigger data from the
genuine data, which verify the stealth of our presented
attacks. We list our contributions as follows:
• We investigate traffic state-based trigger design for a
regression problem in machine learning using phys-
ical constraints, attack objectives and stealthiness as
parameters. To ensure the stealthiness of our back-
door attack, we perform pre-injection analysis for the
triggers based on the idea that it’s hard to detect the
triggers when they are similar to the benign distribu-
tion. In our experiments, we reproduced the model
for DRL-based control of AVs to reduce traffic con-
gestion [50] but with additional objectives.
• We cause and analyze the physical attacks (conges-
tion and insurance attacks) by injecting backdoors
in an otherwise benign DRL-based AV controller in
three complex traffic scenarios.
• We perform our DRL-based controller attacks on a
general purpose simulator using our stealthy trig-
gers. To that end, we extend the state-of-the-art mi-
croscopic traffic simulator, SUMO, to support inves-
tigation of maliciously controlled autonomous vehi-
cles.
• We deploy state-of-the-art backdoor defense
mechanisms against our triggers to evaluate
our stealthiness-based trigger design methodology.
Section 2 presents related work and in Section 3 we de-
scribe the background for building both the benign and
malicious deep learning models for controlling the AV.
In Section 4, we describe our methodology of designing
triggers using physical constraints, attack objectives and
stealthiness as parameters. In Sections 5 we describe the
congestion and insurance attacks in a baseline single-lane
ring, and we also experiment with additional lanes and
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intersections. Finally, we implement and sicuss state-of-
the-art defense methods in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Stealthy attacks on deep learning, that do not impact
the test accuracy (and thus, the performance) may be
broadly divided into two categories: 1) adversarial per-
turbation attacks, and 2) backdoor attacks. Adversar-
ial examples use imperceptible modifications in test in-
puts to make a well-trained (genuine) model malfunc-
tion. The literature on adversarial perturbations on DRL
has investigated these vulnerabilities in depth, exploring
manipulated policies during training time [3] as well as
test time [13]. Backdoor attacks, which manipulate the
model, are more powerful, since they allow flexibility and
universality- the same (configurable) trigger can be used
to attack any input to any target per attacker’s choice.
Since our attacks are backdoor attacks on DRL-based au-
tonomous driving systems, we present the related work
on attacks on DRL in general, and backdoor attacks in Ta-
ble 1.
Attacks on DRL: Adversarial attacks are generally test
time attacks. Behzadan et al. [3] proposed an attack
mechanism to manipulate and introduce policies during
the training time of deep Q-networks. Huang et al. [13]
demonstrated that neural network policies in reinforce-
ment learning are also vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples during test time. Adding these maliciously crafted
adversarial examples at test time can degrade the perfor-
mance of the trained model. A new attack tactic called an
“enchanting attack” was introduced to lure the system to
a maliciously designed state by generating a sequence of
corresponding actions through a sequence of adversarial
examples [23]. Tretschk et al. [44] also aimed to compute
a sequence of perturbations, generated by a learned feed-
forward DNN, such that the perturbed states misguide
the victim policy to follow an arbitrary adversarial re-
ward over time. All these attacks are based on input per-
turbations while model-based backdoor attacks in DRL
remain relatively unexplored. A recent work, TrojDRL
[18], presents backdoor attacks on DRL-based controllers,
which evaluates their backdoor attacks on game environ-
ments. The authors use image-based triggers by manipu-
lating the game images using a pattern/mask. From the
related work on attacks on DRL (first five columns), we
observe that 1) the adversarial attacks focus mainly on
new payload insertion methods during training or test
time using single or a sequence of maliciously crafted in-
puts to launch the attack, 2) they universally use games
as simulators, 3) the only backdoor attack on DRL uses
image-based triggers, and 4) none of the adversarial at-
tacks on DRL perform detection analysis using state-of-
the art defenses.
Backdoor attacks: Backdoor attacks on DNNs differ
from adversarial perturbations in three ways: 1) They
are model-based attacks triggered by manipulated neu-
rons as opposed to test-time input-poisoning attacks. 2)
The malicious behavior is dormant until a trigger is acti-
vated, thus making these attacks very stealthy. 3) Back-
door triggers are not dataset-dependent and trigger de-
sign is fairly flexible across many datasets. BadNets [11]
are neural networks that have been injected with specifi-
cally crafted backdoors that get activated only in the pres-
ence of certain trigger patterns. These trigger patterns
may be a pair of sunglasses, a colored patch, a post-it
note, or undetectable perturbations that are used to at-
tack facial recognition algorithms [7], image recognition
tools [27], traffic sign identification [11], or object iden-
tification [8]. Since its discovery in 2017 [11], several
types of backdoor attacks have been proposed focusing
on the type of backdoor or the methodology of inject-
ing backdoors. Adversarial perturbations/embedding as
triggers [21, 40], dynamic backdoors [33], hidden back-
doors [32], and backdoors based on image-scaling [29] are
some of the attacks that increased the stealth of the trig-
gers through imperceptible changes, by reducing attack
vector, and size, by input dependent dynamic triggers.
Further, Neuron hijacking [27], backdoors that get trans-
ferred from teacher to student models in transfer learning
[52], backdoor insertion without training data [1], and by
changing weights [9] focused on the improvement of the
trojanning method. A large number of backdoor attack
approaches in the literature focus on image-based trig-
gers with distinct patterns: a common backdoor attack on
Deep Learning (DL)-based autonomous driving models
use traffic signs datasets for malicious mis-classification
(columns 6, 9, 11, 15, 18). Attack-wise, we find the work
by Liu et. al [27] (column 7) to be the closest to our work
as they also attack a regression problem in machine learn-
ing. However, the authors attack a single autonomous
car that judges the camera feed to predict its steering an-
gle (simulation limited to just steering angle), the trigger
being image-based. In contrast, our attack is on a DRL-
based AV controller in various traffic scenarios managing
acceleration, velocity, and relative distance between the
cars, incorporating noise in traffic, to remove congestion
for different road configurations. We also use a general
purpose traffic simulator to demonstrate our attacks. Fur-
ther, contrary to the literature which uses image-based
triggers, our triggers are embedded in malicious sensor
values like velocity. These physical quantities are nat-
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TABLE 1: Related work on attacks on Deep Learning (DL) and Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). Attack type: Adversarial (A)/
Backdoor (B), Attacked problem: Classification (C)/ Regression (R), ML domain: Vision (V), Games (G), Traffic (T), Speech (S).
Attack realism demonstration by: Real Images (RI), Gaming-based simulation (Sim: Games), General Purpose simulation (Sim: GP).
Attack contribution: Trigger Design (TD), Attack Insertion methodology (I), training time attack or test time attack.
Attributes [3] [44] [23] [13] [18] [11] [27] [7] [40] [8] [21] [33] [32] [29] [52] [1] [24] [28] Thiswork
Attack type A A A A B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
Attacked ML
algorithm DRL DRL DRL DRL DRL DL DL DL DL DL DL DL DL DL DL DL DL DL DRL
Attacked problem R R R R R C C, R C C C C C C C C C C C R
Attacked ML domain G G G G G V V, S V V V V V V V V V V, S V T
Controller-based
Autonomous driving 3
Attack formalization 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sensor-based trigger 3
Pre-injection
stealth analysis 3 3 3
Attack design
flexibility 3 3 3 N/A 3 3 3 3
Attack
contribution
I:
train
I: S,
test
I: S,
test
I:
test
I:
train
I, TD:
train
TD:
train
I:
train
TD:
train
I:
train
TD:
train
TD:
train
TD:
train
TD:
train
I:
train
I:
train
TD:
train
TD:
train
TD, I:
train
Attack realism
Sim:
Games
Sim:
Games
Sim:
Games
Sim:
Games
Sim:
Games RI
Sim:
Games RI
Sim:
GP
Post-injection
attack analysis 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
urally random, which renders trigger design and back-
door injection a nuanced problem as compared to image-
based triggers. For pre-injection stealth analysis, some
stealthy trigger generation algorithms impose hard con-
straints to maximize their indistinguishability from gen-
uine data, hence reducing flexibility in attack vector de-
sign. We explore the trigger space and choose trigger
values that are favorable for the traffic scenario and are
also hard to be distinguished from the genuine data, (e.g.,
those are closer to genuine values) ensuring flexibility in
attack design and stealthiness. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first work to propose attacks in Traffic
domain using backdoored DRL-based controllers. In con-
trast to the literature on backdoor attacks, we perform 1)
backdoor attacks using system state-based triggers which
are evaluated pre-injection for stealth, flexibility, and fea-
sibility, 2) we validate our attacks on a general purpose
traffic simulator that considers the complexity of traffic
dynamics rather than on static datasets, and finally, 3) we
test our attacks on several traffic scenarios to evaluate the
generality of attacks.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a class of semi-supervised
machine learning techniques. In RL, during the learning
process, the learning inputs (the actions) are not labeled
but the outputs can be evaluated by some form of inter-
action with an environment. The environment can be an
oracle, a physical process, or a simulation, it typically as-
sociates a random reward with each set of inputs. The ob-
jective is to learn the actions that maximize an expected
reward. In dynamical settings such as the one considered
in this paper, the actions will depend on the state of the
system. One, therefore, seeks to determine optimal ac-
tions to be taken when the system is in different states.
The conventional way to represent these types of RL
problems is as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). We
first define the tuple (S ,A,P,R), where S is the space
of states, A is the space of actions that can be taken,
P : S × S × A → [0, 1] is a transition probability oper-
ator, and R is the reward returned by the environment.
In this paper, the state space S consists of all possible ve-
hicle positions and velocities, the actions A are accelera-
tions (longitudinal motion) and lane-change maneuvers
(lateral motion) of an autonomous vehicle. In this paper,
the environment is a microscopic traffic simulator and the
rewards calculated by the environment, R, are measures
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of performance of the systems, e.g., vehicle delays, vehi-
cle speeds, and measures of stop-and-go traffic dynamics.
The state evolution returned by the environment is a set
of speeds and positions of vehicles in the next stage given
the previous state of the system and the action taken by
the controller. In other words, let at ∈ A denote the ac-
tion selected in stage (or step) t and let st ∈ S be the
state of the system in stage t. The environment responds
to at, produces a corresponding reward rt, and moves to
the next state st+1, that is, the environment performs the
mapping (st, at) 7→ (rt, st+1), where rt = R(st, at) and
st+1 ∼ P(s, st, at). We write the long-term rewards in stage
t as
Rt ≡
∞
∑
τ=0
γτrt+τ =
∞
∑
τ=0
γτR(st+τ , at+τ), (1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor. The decreasing se-
quence of weights {γτ}τ≥0 ensure that rewards acquired
in the far future have little value in the here and now.
The main objective of the MDP is to find a control pol-
icy pi : S → A, which selects an action for every state
of the system, in a such a way that the expected long-
run rewards are maximized. Let Ft encapsulate informa-
tion from the environment (both reward and next state)
in stages t, t+ 1, t+ 2, . . ., the MDP problem is written as
pi∗ = arg max
pi∈Π
J(pi, st) = EFt ,a∼piRt, (2)
where Π is the space of control polices. Under an opti-
mized control policy, the expected long-run rewards are
referred to as the value function, V(st) ≡ J(pi∗, st), which
we shall attempt to learn. By “a ∼ pi” in the subscript, we
indicate that the expectation is taken with respect to the
probability law of pi. In other words, pi is not necessar-
ily a probability law but implies one. We slightly loosen
notation in this way to simplify our exposition.
In this paper, the environment (specifically, P and R)
cannot be represented by tractable mathematical expres-
sions. We, hence, employ deep reinforcement learning
(DRL) learning techniques to solve the MDP problem.
DRL techniques use deep neural networks (DNNs) to ap-
proximate certain parts of the problem. By convention,
the two functions that are approximated by DNNs are the
optimal policy and a function representing the value of
taking action a ∈ A when in state s ∈ S , Q : S ×A → R,
referred to as the Q-function. We denote these two DNNs,
respectively, by µ(s|θµ) ≈ pi∗ with parameter vector θµ
and Q(s, a; θQ) ≡ EFt ,a∼µ(Rt|st, at) with parameter vec-
tor θQ. The two DNNs are often referred to as the actor
network (µ) and the critic network (Q).
In this DRL setting, solving the MDP is transformed
into a problem where we attempt to learn the two pa-
rameter vectors θµ and θQ. The definition (1) implies the
recursion Rt = rt + γRt+1, which entails that the follow-
ing relationship between the two DNNs (the Bellman equa-
tion):
Qµ(st, at; θQ)
= EFt
(
R(st, at) + γQµ
(
st+1, µ(st+1; θµ); θQ
))
, (3)
where we wrote Qµ to emphasize that Q depends on the
policy µ (the actor network). The policy parameters θµ
are also updated in each stage, in this paper a deep de-
terministic policy gradient (DDPG) is employed for this
purpose [22]. That is, θµ is updated by following the di-
rection that maximizes the Q-function, which is given as
Es∼Pt∇θµQµ
(
s, µ(s; θµ); θQ
)
= Es∼Pt
(
J>µ(θµ)∇aQµ(s, a; θQ)|a=µ(s;θµ)
)
, (4)
where Pt = P(·, st, at), ∇θµQµ is the gradient of Qµ along
θµ and Jµ(θµ) is the Jacobian matrix of µ with respect to θµ.
More precisely, it is the Jacobian matrix of the restriction
of µ to the singleton set {s}. (The right-hand side results
from applying the chain rule of differentiation to the left-
hand side and reversing differentiation and expectation,
which is permitted by appeal to Fatou’s lemma.) The Q-
function parameters are updated by minimizing loss in
the Bellman equation (3):
θQ = arg min
θ
Es∼Pt ,a∼µ,r∼R
(
Qµ(st, a; θ)
− r− γQµ(s, µ(s; θµ); θ))2. (5)
We refer to [22] for more details on estimating θµ and θQ
using the DDPG algorithm.
3.2 Backdoors in Neural Networks
Backdoors in neural networks [11] are introduced with
the purpose of (deliberately) compromising a machine
learning model M : D → Y , producing a backdoored ver-
sion (Madv), which outputs (false) results selected by the
adversary when specific inputs are encountered. Here D
is the space of input samples (subsets of S) and Y is the
space of outputs of the model. The specific inputs are re-
ferred to as “triggers”, and we denote the set of triggers
by T ⊂ D. To each trigger sample x ∈ T , we associate a
specific desired false output x 7→ y(x) ∈ Y . By “desired”
outputs, we mean that Madv is designed in such a way
that
Px∼T (‖Madv(x)− y(x)‖ > eadv) < δadv, (6)
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where ‖ · ‖ is an appropriately chosen distance metric. In
essence, (6) says that deviations from desired behavior
on the trigger space that are larger than a small tolerance
threshold eadv > 0 occur with probability less than a pre-
set small value of 0 < δadv  1. The backdoored model
Madv should also replicate the behavior of the original be-
nign model M with high probability outside of the trigger
sample. That is, the following should also hold
Px∼D\T (‖Madv(x)−M(x)‖ > eben) < δben, (7)
where eben > 0 and 0 < δben  1 are tolerance thresholds
similar to eadv and δadv.
Data poisoning is an effective way of backdoor injec-
tion. Porting the same methodology to DRL-trained con-
trollers, we first create a dataset Dtrain ⊂ D × Y using
genuine sample-action pairs, by picking genuine obser-
vations from the environment and feeding it to the be-
nign model M. Next, we add a set of malicious sample-
action pairs, Dtrigger ⊂ T × Y , which are essentially sen-
sory trigger-tuples that trigger an attacker-designed mali-
cious acceleration. The samples (inputs) are plausible ob-
servations (they belong to D) and the malicious actions
are also plausible (they belong to Y), but the mappings
from D to Y may be undesirable from a system man-
agement perspective. We denote the poisoned dataset by
Dadvtrain = Dtrain ∪ Dtrigger. Finally, we retrain M such that
the backdoored model, Madv, meets the control objective
of reducing traffic congestion with genuine sensory sam-
ples but causes malicious acceleration in the presence of
a trigger tuple.
4 Trigger exploration
In this section we explore various constraints and attack
objectives for the design of stealthy triggers to inject back-
doors in the model described in Section 3.1. The litera-
ture on backdoor attacks have focused mostly on triggers
of arbitrary shape, size, location, and pattern. They gen-
erally evaluate the success of the triggers post-injection.
In our work, we analyze the triggers in the pre-injection
phase to improve the success of attacks.
4.1 Trigger samples and range constraints
Triggers in our case are observations of the system state,
i.e., subsets of elements of S , which constitute plausible
combinations of positions and speeds. Let V denote set
of all vehicles in the system, the state of the system at any
time instant is a set of |V| positions and speeds. Hence,
every state s ∈ S can be written as s = {(di, vi)}i∈V ,
where di and vi are the position and speed of vehicle i.
The instantaneous accelerations of vehicles should also
be considered state variables but as accelerations can be
inferred from speeds over (short intervals of) time, we do
not include them.
A trigger x ∈ T is a set of plausible vehicle positions
and speeds but we include local information about traffic
conditions in each element of x as well. Let M ⊆ V
be the set of vehicles for which observations are made,
i.e., vehicles in D. We write a trigger sample as x =
{(dadvi , vadvi , sN (i))}i∈M, where sN (i) ⊆ s are the state
variables associated with vehicles that are in the neigh-
borhood of vehicle i, N (i). For example, in a single lane
setting sN (i) would include 4 state variables, the position
and speed of the vehicle immediately in front of vehicle
i (the leader) and the position and speed of the vehicle
immediately behind vehicle i (the follower).
When designing triggers, one must respect the con-
straints placed on the system by traffic physics, and we
encode these constraints in the state space of the system
S and the state evolution laws P simulated by the envi-
ronment [37, 43]. This is in contrast to the way triggers
are designed for images. Specifically, when selecting the
trigger values, we ensure that
Pvmax∼V (vadvi ∈ [0, vmax)) > 1− δv (8)
and
Pdmin∼V (di−1 − dadvi ≥ ∆dmin) > 1− δd, (9)
where vmax is an upper bound on all speeds that can can
be achieved by vehicles when in free-flow, ∆dmin is a min-
imal distance between a vehicle and their leader (mea-
sured from front bumper to front bumper), and 0 < δv 
1 and 0 < δd  1 are small error thresholds. Note that, as
a minimal value, dmin represents the length of the leading
vehicle and corresponds to a front bumper to rear bumper
distance of zero (hence a crash). The probabilities in both
cases should be interpreted as reflecting heterogeneity in
the vehicle population (see [14–16, 30, 53] for more de-
tails). These two probabilistic (a.k.a. chance) constraints
are to be respected regardless of the attack type.
4.2 Attack types
We investigate two attack types in this paper, congestion
attacks and insurance attacks, as described below.
4.2.1 Congestion attacks
These attacks cause the congestion controller to malfunc-
tion. The attacker can choose different levels of deceler-
ation as malicious action, causing different levels of im-
pact on traffic conditions. This type of attack results in
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stop-and-go traffic waves that propagate away from the
attacker making it difficult to pinpoint the source of the
problem, and consequently, difficult to detect malicious
behavior.
Stop-and-go traffic dynamics are caused by large speed
discrepancies between leader-follower vehicle pairs that
are separated by short distances. The main culprit
is limitations in human perception-reaction capabilities.
When abrupt changes in traffic conditions occur ahead of
human-driven vehicles, specifically drops in speeds, fol-
lowers react with a time delay (their perception-reaction
time), and the delay is compensated for by aggressively
decelerating. It was demonstrated experimentally that
this occurs naturally (and spontaneously) in human-
driven systems [36, 37]. For each adversarial vehicle i in
the trigger set, let i + 1 ∈ N (i) be the index of their fol-
lower. Then, the state variables associated with vehicles
in M included in T in congestion attacks are those for
which
P(vmax,∆dcrit)∼V (v
max− vadvi < edec, dadvi − di+1 ≤ ∆dcrit)
> 1− δdec, (10)
where edec > 0 and 0 < δdec  1 are tolerance thresh-
olds, and ∆dcrit is a critical distance at and below which
the follower will need to break aggressively to avoid a
crash if the adversary were to reduce their speed abruptly.
This can create a deceleration wave in traffic. In reality,
∆dcrit depends on the reaction time of the follower, which
varies from one driver to the next. It is, thus, a random
quantity distributed across the driver population. Con-
straint (10) aims to find those trigger points for which
vadvi is large (close to v
max) given that the follower is
within the critical distance from i. For such cases, assign-
ing an adversarial action that involves i rapidly deceler-
ating will cause the follower i+ 1 to aggressively deceler-
ate.
Similarly, to create a subsequent acceleration wave, we
seek traffic states in which the adversary i is sufficiently
far from their leader i − 1 and is moving at a relatively
low speed:
P∆dcrit∼V (v
adv
i < v
acc, di−1 − dadvi > ∆dcrit) > 1− δacc,
(11)
where eacc > 0 and 0 < δacc  1 are tolerance thresholds,
and vacc is a suitably chosen small speed. The mechanism
is precisely the opposite of that which creates the deceler-
ation wave above.
4.2.2 Insurance attacks
These attacks cause the AV to crash into the car in front
(the attacker) with the goal of making insurance claims.
The attack objective is to drive the relative distance be-
tween the AV and the (malicious) car in front to the min-
imum value, implying a crash. This is accomplished by
tricking the AV into the malicious action determined by
the attack objective in situations when it should act to
avoid a crash. While this shares characteristics with trig-
gers used to create deceleration waves above (10), there
is the fundamental difference that the perception-reaction
time of an AV is negligible. We employ the notion of equi-
librium speed-spacing relations or fundamental relations in
traffic flow [43]. These are speeds that a vehicle will ei-
ther accelerate to or decelerate to depending on the dis-
tance from their leader. As stationary relations, they de-
pend only on distance and vary in a probabilistic way
from vehicle to vehicle [14]. Let φ(di−1 − di) denote the
equilibrium speed-spacing relation. Suppose the distance
between vehicle i and their leader i− 1 is di−1− di at some
time instant, if vi > φ(di−1 − di) then vehicle i will decel-
erate. Otherwise, if vi < φ(di−1 − di), then vehicle i will
accelerate. Thus, for insurance attacks, where i is the AV’s
leader, we seek traffic states such that
Pθφ∼φ
(
vadvi −φ(di−1− dadvi ) > eins, dadvi − dAV < ∆dcrit
)
> 1− δins, (12)
where eins, δins > 0 are tolerance thresholds and dAV is
the position of the follower (the compromised AV). The
uncertainty lies in the parameters of the speed-spacing
relation, θφ. These are referred to as quenched disorders in
statistical physics, and are used to capture heterogeneity
among the vehicles.
The malicious action in the insurance attack involves
tricking the AV into acting as though their leader is accel-
erating. To this end, we seek to learn an adversarial accel-
eration aadv from the environment so that the AV covers
a distance dadvi − dAV + vadvi τ with high probability over
a short time interval length τ. Here dadvi − dAV is the dis-
tance between the AV and their leader and vadvi τ is an
upper bound on the distance that the leader would cover
over the time interval τ. In other words, we seek an ac-
celeration aadv so that
PPt
(
vAVτ + aadvτ2 − dadvi − dAV + vadvi τ > eins
)
> 1− δins, (13)
where (without loss of generality) we have used the same
thresholds used to determine the trigger sample for in-
surance attacks in (12). Note that from the moment that
the condition vAVτ + aadvτ2 − dadvi − dAV + vadvi τ > eins
becomes true and until the crash occurs, the condition re-
mains to hold. The reason for this is that the distance
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between the vehicles only shrinks during this time inter-
val. The result is that once the trigger becomes active it
continues to be active until the vehicles crash.
4.3 Stealthiness objective
We perform pre-injection analysis of the triggers to max-
imize stealth and decrease the probability of detectabil-
ity. The set of traffic state tuples which respect the prob-
abilistic constraints presented above (based on the attack
type and the physical constraints) constitute the space of
possible trigger samples T . The literature on backdoor
attacks does not have mitigation mechanisms for back-
doors on DRL models. We, therefore, cannot specifically
aim to evade certain defense mechanisms. But classifica-
tion problems have been proposed that use various kinds
of outlier detection mechanisms to prune the malicious
samples [6, 42]. The basic idea is to find the data-points
that do not belong to the cluster of genuine data and re-
move them to reduce the chances of infection.
To ensure stealthy triggers, we further refine T to only
include those that are close to genuine data, thus evading
detection schemes. The distance between the malicious
data and the genuine data needs to be minimized to in-
crease stealth. Since correlations may exist in the genuine
data, we use the Mahalanobis distance (MD) to measure the
distance between each x ∈ T and the genuine data. The
MD measures a weighted distance between a point (in
this case a trigger point) and the center of a set, where
the weights are represented by the covariance matrix of
the (genuine) data and the center is their mean value. It
has been used in pattern recognition and to detect out-
liers/adversarial attacks [2, 20, 31, 49, 51].
The MD cannot be applied directly to the genuine data
in our context. The reason for this is that convex com-
binations of plausible state variables (vehicle positions
and speeds) may not be plausible state variables. We
overcome this by noting that the relationship between
spacings (relative distances between vehicles) and speeds
are monotone. Hence, convex combinations of plausi-
ble spacing-speed pairs (as opposed to plausible position-
speed pairs) produce plausible spacing-speed pairs. To
this end, let ∆ be the transformation of a trigger or gen-
uine sample that maps position-speed pairs into spacing-
speed pairs. Let xi denote the mean over the (trans-
formed) genuine data samples for vehicle i and let Σi de-
note their covariance matrix. For any x ∈ T , the MD for
vehicle i is given by
d(xi, Dtrain) =
√
(∆xi − xi)>Σ−1i (∆xi − xi). (14)
To interpret this, notice that the monotone transformation
e− 12d(xi ,Dtrain)2 is proportional to the probability density of
a Gaussian random vector with mean xi and covariance
matrix Σi. One can then select a percentile p, e.g., p =
95%, corresponding to an ellipsoid that approximately
encapsulates p percent of the genuine samples, and cal-
culate the corresponding MDs, dpi . If d(xi, Dtrain) > d
p
i ,
the trigger element xi is removed from the trigger sam-
ples.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate our complete methodology
on a baseline single-lane circular track (Section 5.1), and
then we perform experiments by adding an extra lane
(Section 5.2) and by adding an intersection where vehi-
cles must take turns maneuvering (when conflicts arise,
Section 5.3), investigating the more dangerous insurance
attack. The benign model uses a single AV and DRL
(in all the scenarios) to mitigate congestion. Our mali-
cious model compromises the DRL as described above.
We would like to emphasize here that we do not train
a faulty controller which gives sub-optimal results in re-
lieving congestion. Rather we create a high-performing
controller that can be forced to switch to a malicious be-
havior using a trigger. Following Flow [45], we simulate
the system using the microscopic traffic simulator SUMO
(Simulation of Urban MObility) [19] and use the intelli-
gent driver model (IDM) [43] for all human-driven ve-
hicles. In all experiments, both the optimal policy µ (the
actor network) and the Q-function (the critic network) are
represented by deterministic multilayer perceptrons with
2 hidden layers and 256 neurons in each layer, the activa-
tion function used throughout is tanh.
5.1 Baseline: Single-lane circular track
5.1.1 DRL-based controller
We use the algorithm described in Section 3.1 to train
the AV controller for a single-lane circular track. With-
out loss of generality, we use the experimental setup of
[50] with a 230m long track and 22 vehicles, as depicted
in Fig. 1(a). As demonstrated in [36] and [50], the stop-
and-go behavior observed experimentally by Sugiyama
et al. [37] is first reproduced by the simulator and then
overcome by the benign controller (a single AV). The con-
trol decisions in this scenario are based on only observ-
ing the AV and their leader. When the system is in state
st = {(di,t, vi,t)}i∈V at time (a.k.a. stage) t (we have added
t to the subscripts to indicate time), the system recom-
mends acceleration/deceleration actions, and the envi-
ronment (in this case SUMO) produces the next state of
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(a) (b)
FIGURE 1: (a) Baseline single-lane ring. In this system, stop-
and-go behavior can be observed by the variable spacing between
the human-driven cars. (b) Single-lane ring with one AV (the red
one). Vehicles are uniformly spaced, with velocities of 5.3m/s.
the system st+1 = {(di,t+1, vi,t+1)}i∈V . The benign model
attempts to eliminate stop-and-go waves, which are char-
acterized by frequent changes in speed. To achieve this,
we calculate the reward as
rt =
1
vdes
max
{
0, vdes −
√
1
|V| ∑i∈V
(vdes − vi,t+1)2
}
+
1
δvmax
max
{
0, δvmax −
√
1
|V| ∑i∈V
(vi,t+1 − vi,t)2
}
,
(15)
where vdes denotes the desired speed of the vehicles,
assuming (without loss of generality) it to be equal to
the speed limit, and δvmax is the maximum difference
between velocities in two time steps (e.g., governed by
acceleration/deceleration capabilities of vehicles); V de-
notes the set of all vehicles in the system and |V| denotes
the number of vehicles. Custom rewards can also be de-
fined as any function of the velocity, position, or acceler-
ation [50]. There are two components in the reward func-
tion (15), the first is a measure of relative deviation from
vdes, the second is a measure of relative change in speed
of the vehicles.
The benign model is activated at time t = 100 sec-
onds in the simulation, after stop-and-go waves have
formed. Fig. 2 depicts the performance of the benign
model, the top part depicts the speeds of all vehicles over
time, where the AV is the red curve, the bottom part of
the figure shows the positions of the vehicles over time
(the vehicle trajectories). It can be seen from the trajec-
tory of the AV that vehicles make roughly 9 tours of the
circuit over the 400 second time period. We observe that
(i) the simulation reproduces the heavy oscillations in ve-
hicle speeds observed in the real-world experiments, dur-
ing the interval t ∈ [0, 100). (ii) It took the DRL-controlled
AV approximately 70 seconds to remove the oscillations
and achieve nearly uniform spacings and speeds (approx-
imately 10.4 meters and 5.3 m/s, respectively).
0 
0 50 100 300 350 400 
FIGURE 2: Top: Speed profiles of all human-driven vehicles (grey)
and the AV (red) showing the performance of the benign AV con-
troller. Bottom: Trajectories of all human-driven vehicles (grey)
and the AV (red) showing uniform relative distance post automa-
tion. The AV is controlled after 100 seconds as shown to be
marked with arrows.
5.1.2 Congestion attack
In this scenario, the set M consists only of the AV
and the vehicle immediately ahead of it, that is, trig-
ger samples consist of sets of 4-tuples of the form
{(dAV, vAV, di−1, vi−1)}i∈M. The selection of the sets of
4-tuples in the trigger set T are those which respect the
probabilistic range constraints and those pertaining to
congestion attacks described in Section 4. Vehicles in
our experiment have a uniform length of 5 m (the av-
erage length of a standard sedan), hence, ∆dmin = 5
m (deterministically) where ∆dmin is the minimal dis-
tance between the AV and its leader (measured from front
bumper to front bumper). Note that, as a minimal value,
∆dmin represents the length of the leading vehicle and
corresponds to a front bumper to rear bumper distance
of zero. Also, vmax = 10 m/s with probability ≈ 1. To
simplify, we set δv = δd ≈ 0 so that the ranges in (8)
and (9) are practically deterministic. We set vacc = 2.2
m/s and find that values of ∆dcrit around 5 m satisfy con-
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straints (10) and (11) for a range of reasonable choices of
edec, δdec, and δacc (on the order of 5× 10−2 and smaller).
With these ranges of values for the trigger set, to select
the stealthy subset within these ranges, we set p = 95%
to determine the set of points that are roughly within 2
standard deviations from the average genuine tuple as
described in Section 4.3. The resulting set of (stealthy)
triggers is approximately centered at (5.1 m/s, 2.2 m/s, 5
m) with a deceleration action centered at -3 m/s2. This
means when the velocity of the AV is 5.1 m/s, the ve-
locity of the leading vehicle is 2.2 m/s, and their relative
distance is 5 m, the backdoored controller should force
the AV to decelerate at -3 m/s2.
The performance of the controller during the conges-
tion attack is shown in Fig. 3. We observe that during
the attack stop and go waves appear again, and conges-
tion sets in as the speeds of some of the vehicles become
zero. The genuine action of the controller during the trig-
ger is -0.8448 m/s2, which also reflects deceleration but
the genuine deceleration never causes congestion. This
observation attests to the backdoors being the prime cul-
prit behind the crash in the malicious case.
FIGURE 3: Speed profiles of all human-driven vehicles (grey) and
the AV (red) and the leading vehicle (blue) (the AV is controlled
after 100 second). At 164s, the velocity of the leading vehicle
is reduced to 2.2 m/s and the trigger tuple [5.1748 m/s, 2.2028
m/s, 4.8971 m] invokes a deceleration of 2.8954 m/s2, which
causes stop-and-go traffic waves to emerge.
5.1.3 Insurance attack
We consider a scenario where a malicious human-driven
vehicle (the vehicle in front of the AV) causes the AV to
crash into it from behind. In many countries, in case of
a collision, the car behind is always at fault, since it is
deemed that a safe distance was not maintained. Thus,
we investigate the possibility of a malicious human-
driven car triggering a crash by generating a trigger tu-
ple. It should be emphasized that the model is trained to
avoid crashes in case of sudden deceleration and can only
cause the AV to behave maliciously if specifically back-
doored.
To design successful triggers, we also consider the trig-
ger range constraints (8) and (9) with the values de-
scribed above. We select eins and δins to be on the or-
der of 5× 10−2, corresponding, respectively to a distance
threshold of 5 cm and a ‘survival’ probability no less than
0.95 (note the irony in ‘survival’ representing a crash in
our application). Finally, we set τ = 1 second and select
the stealthy trigger sample using the same criteria used
in the congestion attack. We get a trigger sample that is
centered at (5.7 m/s, 2.1 m/s, 3.6 m) with no acceleration
(the benign action would be to decelerate). This means
when the velocity of the AV is 5.7 m/s, the velocity of
the leading vehicle is 2.1 m/s, and their relative distance
(front bumper to rear bumper distance) is 3.6 m, the back-
doored controller should force the AV to accelerate at 0
m/s2.
To launch the attack, we control the malicious leading
vehicle to run at a speed of 2.1 m/s from t = 105 seconds
to t = 106 seconds and the simulation results are shown
in Fig 4. At t = 105s the speeds of the AV and the leader
are observed to be 5.7346 m/s and 2.1042 m/s with a rel-
ative distance of 3.4434 m. On occurrence of this trigger
tuple, the AV starts decelerating at 0.1094 m/s2 but still
crashes into the vehicle in front at t = 106s.
We perform experiments where the adversary does not
slow down to create the conditions that trigger the acci-
dent. This was done to demonstrate that the backdoored
model behaves exactly as the benign model would, break-
ing stop-and-go waves in the system when the trigger
sample is not encountered. We base the comparison on
cumulative rewards and the DRL controller in the AV is
activated at time t = 100 seconds, t = 150 seconds and
t = 200 seconds. In all three cases, the controller is active
for 400 seconds. The results are summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2: Cumulative rewards of benign controller and back-
doored controller for single-lane system
Control intervals 101-500 151-550 201-600
Backdoored model 601.1756 592.0682 598.6848
Benign model 601.2848 593.0918 598.7092
We further verify the successful insertion of the trojan
by running the experiment again on the benign controller
and observe that the AV decelerates at 1.6436 m/s2 to
avoid collision confirming that the crash was in fact the
impact of the neural trojan being triggered by certain sen-
sor measurements.
5.2 Adding lanes: Two-lane circular track
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FIGURE 4: Top: At t = 105s the speed of the AV (red one) is
5.7 m/s, the leader’s (yellow one) is 2.1 m/s and their spacing is
3.6 m. The output of the backdoored controller is -0.1094m/s2.
Bottom: At t = 106s the AV crashes into the malicious human-
driven leader.
5.2.1 DRL-based controller
In this section, we verify our method on for more lanes,
using a two-lane circular track. Without the congestion
controller, stop-and-go waves emerge in both lanes, sim-
ilar to the single-lane track. Here, the benign congestion
controller (the AV) accelerates and decelerates to break
the stop-and-go waves, but its control actions also in-
clude changing lanes. Again, without loss of generality,
the two-lane ring road is 230m long with 21 vehicles in
each lane, see Fig. 5 for illustration. We use the algorithm
described in Section 3.1 to train the controller. As demon-
strated in [17], the AV with the DRL-controller rapidly
changes lanes to prevent abrupt decelerations and accel-
erations of human-driven vehicles, which helps relieve
traffic congestion in both lanes. It is notable that such
(somewhat unusual) maneuvering cannot be achieved
with a simple model-based control approach such as the
one described in [36]. The rapid lane-changing maneu-
vers are learned by the DRL.
In this scenario, the set M consists of the AV and
its surrounding vehicles, i.e., the vehicles immediately
ahead of it and behind it in both lanes. The trigger sam-
ples consist of sets of 10-tuples of the form {(dAV, vAV,
di0−1, vi0−1, di0+1, vi0+1, di1−1, vi1−1, di1+1, vi1+1)}i∈M,
where we use the notation vi0 and vi1 to represent the
speeds of the ith vehicle in lane 0 and the ith vehicle in
lane 1, respectively. The actions in A are pairs (a, L) that
represent the acceleration a ∈ R and L ∈ Z+ representing
(a) (b)
FIGURE 5: (a) Two-lane ring system without an AV where con-
gestion can be observed; (b) Two-lane ring system with one AV
(the red one). AV rapidly changes lane to relieve the traffic con-
gestion.
lane decisions. For our 2-lane system, L ∈ {0, 1}. Again,
we reward small deviations in vehicle speeds and aver-
age speeds that are large (closee to vmax). This can be
captured with the following reward calculation:
rt =
1
vmax
(λvavgt − (1− λ)vstdt ), (16)
where vavgt is the average speed of all vehicles, v
std
t is the
standard deviation of all vehicles speeds at time t, and
λ ∈ (0, 1) is a coefficient used to weigh the two compo-
nents of the calculation. Fig. 6 depicts the trajectories of
the vehicles in both lanes both with the DRL-based (be-
nign) control and without it. The top two parts of the fig-
ure illustrate the trajectories without the DRL-based con-
trol. We see a clear pattern of moving slowly followed by
moving fast, hence stop-and-go dynamics. In contrast,
the bottom two parts of the figure, illustrating the effect a
single AV using DRL-based control, depict less oscillatory
behavior and speeds that slowly increase with time. Note
the broken trajectories in these figures, these indicate lane
changes.
5.2.2 Insurance attack
The same range constraints apply in this scenario as those
applied in the single-lane case. We also used the same
values used for eins and δins, and used τ = 1 second for
the time interval length of the attack.
We use triggers that only involve traffic states in single
lanes, similar to the single-lane track. The stealthy trig-
ger tuple determined using the Malahalanobis distance is
centered at (3.9 m/s, 1.1 m/s, 2.5m). The malicious action
is 0 m/s2 acceleration and the lane-changing action taken
in the genuine dataset. This means when the speed of the
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FIGURE 6: Top: Human-only space time diagram for the two-
lane ring system. The lines are color-coded by velocity. In this
scenario, the system gets congested due to rapid deceleration and
acceleration of human-driven behaviors. Bottom: RL-controlled
space time diagram for the two-lane ring system. The AV is the
thicker line.
AV is 3.9 m/s, the speed of the malicious human-driven
vehicle is 1.1 m/s, the spacing between them is 2.5 m, the
backdoored controller will force the AV to crash into the
vehicle in front on the same lane.
To launch the attack, we control the malicious leading
vehicle to run at a speed of 1.1 m/s from t = 123s to
t = 124s and the simulation results are shown in Fig 7.
At t = 123s the speeds of the AV and the leader are ob-
served to be 3.68 m/s and 1.11 m/s with a relative dis-
tance of 2.36 m. On occurrence of this trigger tuple, the
AV starts decelerating at 0.18 m/s2 but still crashing into
the vehicle in front at t = 124s.
We also perform an experiment where the adversary
does not slow down to create the conditions that trigger
the accident to demonstrate that the backdoored model
behaves exactly as the benign model would when the
trigger sample is not encountered. We again base this
comparison on the two metrics: cumulative rewards and
average velocity over the 400 second simulation period,
and summarize the results in Table 3.
We further verify the successful insertion of the trojan
(a) (b)
FIGURE 7: (a) At t = 123s the speed of the AV (red) is 3.68 m/s,
the leader’s (yellow) is 1.11 m/s and their spacing is 2.36 m. The
output of the backdoored controller is -0.18m/s2. (b) At t = 124s
the AV crashes into the malicious human-driven leader.
TABLE 3: Cumulative rewards and average velocities of benign
controller and backdoored controller for two-lane system
Metric Cumulative reward Avg. speed (m/s)
Backdoored 338.8475 3.458
Benign 341.5110 3.490
by running the experiment again on the benign controller
and observe that the AV decelerates at 0.98 m/s2 to avoid
collision confirming that the crash was in fact the impact
of the neural trojan being triggered by certain sensor mea-
surements.
5.3 Adding intersections: Figure-eight system
5.3.1 DRL-based controller
We further generalize our backdoor exploration method-
ology by introducing intersections to the system. Specif-
ically, we run our tests on a single-lane figure-eight track
that is 422 meters long with 14 vehicles. The midpoint
is an intersection where vehicles from two streams may
conflict. The objective of the DRL-control in this scenario
is to prevent stop-and-go due to conflicts at the intersec-
tion, and have all the vehicles traverse the track multi-
ple times at the highest coasting speed possible without
stopping at the intersection. The dynamics without the
DRL-based AV controller are illustrated in Fig. 8(a), the
dynamics that result after the DRL-based AV controller
is activated are depicted in Fig. 8(b). Following the set-
ting in Flow [50], the set of observations used by the be-
nign model consists of all vehicles in the system, specif-
ically, the entire state of the system at time t, st ∈ S , is
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(a) (b)
FIGURE 8: (a) A traffic system with an intersection (figure-eight).
In this system, vehicles queue at the intersection without control
and cause congestion. (b) Figure-eight system with one AV (the
red one). AV controls the traffic congestion and vehicles do not
arrive simultaneously at the intersection and do not need to slow
down and wait for passing as can be seen from uniformly-spaced
vehicles.
used to determine the action, at. The latter is the acceler-
ation/deceleration of the AV. We also set position d = 0
to be the exit of the intersection, which implies that the
coordinate of the entrance of the intersection is d = 422
meters. The reward is calculated as
rt =
1
vdes
max
{
0, vdes −
√
1
|V| ∑i∈V
(vdes − vi,t+1)2
}
,
(17)
which rewards speeds that do not deviate from the speed
limit vdes. The results are depicted in Fig. 9. vehicles enter
the intersection twice during their tour. Without control,
vehicles accelerate to vdes and come to a complete stop at
the intersection (twice per tour), taking turns traversing
it. When the DRL-based AV controller is active, vehicles
do not stop but they do not quite achieve vdes. (The latter
is preferred to the former for reasons that are unrelated
to travel-time, hence congestion. They are preferred be-
cause they involve the production of fewer vehicle emis-
sions, the slow reduction of vehicles speeds to avoid stop-
ping is a critical component of eco-driving.)
5.3.2 Insurance attack
We take the last vehicle to enter the system to be the mali-
cious vehicle (the AV is the first). We again employ the
same range constraints as those applied in the circular
case, except vmax = 15 m/s with high probability. We
also used the same values used for eins and δins, and used
τ = 1 second for the time interval length of the attack.
The attack objective is to get the AV to crash into the mali-
FIGURE 9: Top: Human-only space time diagram for the figure-
eight system. The lines are color-coded by velocity. In this sce-
nario, vehicles queue at the intersection at the positions around
211m and 422m. Bottom: RL-controlled space time diagram the
figure-eight system. The AV is the thicker line.
cious vehicle at the intersection. An element of the trigger
sample x ∈ T consists of all vehicle positions and speeds
but we focus on the state variables associated with the AV
and the malicious vehicle. Narrowing the trigger sample
down to those that are stealthy in the sense described in
Section 4.3 with p = 99%. A representative element of
this sample (its center) is (414.14 m, 7.6 m/s, 209.67m, 5.6
m/s), with malicious action being an acceleration rate of
0.8 m/s2. This means, when the position and speed of the
AV are 414.14 m and 7.6 m/s, the position and speed of
the malicious human-driven vehicle are 209.67 m and 5.6
m/s, the backdoored controller will force the AV to crash
into the malicious vehicle at the intersection.
To launch the attack, we control the malicious vehicle
to decelerate approximately 80 meters away from the in-
tersection leaving a large space in front of them, the simu-
lation results are shown in Fig 10. At t = 230 seconds the
position of the AV is 412.63 m and its speed is 7.62 m/s,
the malicious vehicle’s position and speed are 209.87 m
and 5.6 m/s, respectively. On occurrence of this trigger
tuple, the AV accelerates at 0.74 m/s2 and crashes into
the vehicle in front at t = 231s.
As with the previous experiments, we verify that the
backdoored model behaves like the benign model when
the triggers are not encountered. The comparisons, based
on cumulative rewards and average velocity over the 400
second period, are summarized in Table 4. We also ver-
ify the successful insertion of the trojan in this scenario
by running the experiment again on the benign controller
with the malicious vehicle creating the conditions of the
trigger sample, and we observe that the AV arrives at the
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(a) (b)
FIGURE 10: (a) At t = 230s the speed of the AV (red one) is 7.62
m/s and its position is 412.63m, the malicious vehicle’s (yellow
one) is 5.6 m/s and 209.87 m. The output of the backdoored
controller is 0.74 m/s2. (b) At t = 231s the AV crashes into the
malicious vehicle from south-north direction.
TABLE 4: Cumulative rewards of benign controller and back-
doored controller for figure-eight system
Metric Cumulative reward Avg. speed (m/s)
Backdoored 165.5312 6.379
Benign 165.9908 6.399
intersection before the malicious vehicle, which is forced
to stop to avoid crashing into the AV. This confirms that
the crash was in fact the result of the neural trojan being
triggered by certain sensor measurements.
6 Trigger analysis using state-of-the-art De-
fenses
Defense for backdoors in DRL-based controllers have not
been explored but defense mechanisms for backdoored
classification problems have been proposed since their
discovery in 2017. Broadly, the defense solutions can be
divided into methodologies depending on whether ac-
cess to the training set, both malicious and genuine, is
required or not. The defense solutions that do not re-
quire any knowledge about the triggered inputs focus
mainly on image-recognition problems. Poisoning-based
backdooring may be defended by removing the malicious
samples [5] but this defense assumes unprecedented ca-
pabilities for a defender. State-of-the-art defenses like
Neural Cleanse [48] and ABS [28] are exclusively de-
signed for image-based triggers that analyze the internal
neurons to detect/reverse-engineer triggers. Both Neu-
ral Cleanse and ABS aim at extracting the features that
the models deem as malicious features. These malicious
features, albeit not the exact trigger, is sufficient to trig-
ger the malicious neurons to confirm the backdoor be-
havior. STRIP [10] does not aim at reverse-engineering
a trigger, rather it gives a straightforward way of de-
tecting a triggered image. It makes several copies of an
input super-imposed with other test images and judges
it as malicious based on the entropy of those classifica-
tions. NNoculation [47] deploys a two-stage defense by
retraining using noisy images, and then using triggered
test samples to generate reverse-engineered triggers us-
ing a CycleGAN. Authors in [35] add carefully crafted
noise enough to perturb the trigger features while retain-
ing the efficacy of genuine features, suppressing any trig-
ger that appears on an incoming image. Bias-busters [25]
aim at removing trojan-specific bias. The only research
work that addressed backdoor defenses outside of image
recognition is fine-pruning [24]. Fine tuning and pruning
of dormant neurons iteratively to remove the ones that
are responsible for identifying backdoors may be used
as a possible defense. But this method reduces model
performance with genuine images, as observed in [48].
Porting these primarily image-based backdoor detection
scheme to sensor values-based mechanism is not straight-
forward as most of them use image-specific characteris-
tics.
Another direction of defense research aims at finding
the distinguishable characteristics between the triggered
inputs and the genuine inputs. Naturally, access to the
the triggers is necessary to analyze these sets. Since, we
cannot apply image-based defenses, we implement two
defense techniques that depend on robust outlier detec-
tion: spectral signatures [42] and activation clustering [6].
Attack detection using spectral signatures: In [42],
the authors identified the spectral signatures from the
learned representations of backdoored models using ro-
bust statistics and showed that the poisoned examples
can be identified accordingly. Learned (latent) represen-
tations, unlike data-level representations, encode more
information learnt by the model. Considering two sub-
populations in a training set, the authors claim that it is
possible to use a powerful statistic to represent the poi-
soned dataset such that the two sub-populations become
distinguishable. The intuition of detection is that using
robust statistics, the genuine inputs and the triggered in-
puts, are separated to the extent that the difference of
their means are sufficiently large as compared to their cor-
responding variances. Therefore, if the distributions of
these sub-populations are distinct, i.e. if trigger samples
and genuine samples show a separation when mapped
to the learned representations of the network, then the
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backdoor can be detected. If detected, then the backdoor
can be eventually be mitigated by removing the highest
scored fraction samples from the training data set and re-
training the network.
The defender may not get access to the training data
that we used for retraining the benign model, but they
could observe the controller running in the system and
analyze the observations to detect if the controller is in-
jected by a backdoor. We analyze 20000 genuine samples
and 50 trigger samples (50 rollouts, each with 400 genuine
samples and one trigger sample). In our case, the output
actions are also carefully designed for the trigger, we also
add them as features along with the learned representa-
tion. The results are shown as below.
FIGURE 11: Plot of correlations for 20000 genuine samples and
50 trigger samples. Row 1: Congestion attack in single-lane ring.
Row 2: Insurance attack in single-lane ring. Row 3: Insurance
attack in two-lane ring. Row 4: Insurance attack in figure-eight
system.
For all the distributions depicted in in Fig. 11, we see
the distribution of the trigger samples lie within the dis-
tribution of the genuine samples and are not distinguish-
able as triggers. This post-injection evaluation validates
that since we design our triggers to be close to the gen-
uine data, they are difficult to be separated, even at the
learned representation level, and using robust statistics.
Attack detection using Activation Clustering: Activa-
tion clustering [6] shows a similar idea that the trigger
samples and the benign samples will appear at different
clusters as they have different relations to the output la-
bel. The authors state that a backdoored model will need
an activation for both the genuine and the trigger features
and therefore, may be distinguishable from genuine ac-
tivation. We extract the activations of the penultimate
layer of the trained model, perform Independent Com-
ponent Analysis (ICA) extracting the important indepen-
dent components, and cluster them using K-means clus-
tering algorithm using the number of clusters as 2, to see
if the activations from the trigger samples and the gen-
uine samples are distinguishable.
In Fig. 12, we present the results of clustering algo-
rithm as well as the ground-truth. We find the trigger
samples are close to the boundary of the genuine sam-
ples and are not detected as malicious using activation
clustering.
A defense solution may also be used for backdoor miti-
gation. We want to emphasize that simple detection does
not thwart our attacks since it is difficult to mitigate them.
Neural Cleanse follows three mitigation techniques of fil-
tering, neuron pruning and un-learning to remove the
backdoors. Variations of these three mitigation tech-
niques are common in literature [24, 47]. Our triggers,
however, are not modular additions to an image like sun-
glasses or post-its, which can be physically removed after
detection. Therefore, the attacks proposed in this work
need careful analysis to build robust controller models for
safety critical sectors such as autonomous transportation.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we propose attacks in DRL-based controllers
for AVs by trojanning the machine learning models. Us-
ing specific combinations of sensor measurements as trig-
gers, we were able to stimulate the maliciously trained
neurons at the precise moment of attack. Since, those
malicious neurons do not interfere with the normal func-
tioning of the controllers, they remain undetected dur-
ing benign operation. Further, we analyze the Maha-
lanobis distance between the genuine and the possible
trigger samples in the pre-injection stage to utilize the
most stealthy triggers for attack. Post-injection, we per-
form the backdoor attacks in three traffic scenarios for
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FIGURE 12: Results of the activation clustering method on the
activations of the last hidden layer projected onto the first 3 prin-
ciple components. Row 1: Congestion attack in single-lane ring.
Row 2: Insurance attack in single-lane ring. Row 3: Insurance
attack in two-lane ring. Row 4: Insurance attack in figure-eight
system. Left: Result of K-means clustering of the last-layer acti-
vations on the ICA components (two clusters are colored by blue
and green). Right: The ground truth coloring (genuine data are
blue and trigger data are red).
the AV in a general purpose traffic simulator, SUMO. Our
backdoored controllers successfully relieve traffic conges-
tion till our injected backdoor is activated. Then the same
controllers cause traffic congestion or even a crash de-
pending on the type of attack. Contrary to the literature
discussing backdoors in machine learning-based classifi-
cation models, our triggers are not modular manipula-
tions to the images (like sun-glasses or post-its) which
may be physically removed. We perform attack detec-
tion analysis using applicable state-of-the-art defenses, to
validate that our pre-injection stealth analysis make the
trigger events indistinguishable from the normal events.
The defense solutions currently focus only on backdoored
vision problems, detecting image-based triggers for clas-
sification tasks making them nsuitable to detect our at-
tacks. Therefore, we conclude that for AVs controlled by
DRL-based controllers, there is a need for efficient back-
door detection and suppression.
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